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Agricultural training is a potentially effective method to diffuse relevant new technologies to increase
productivity and alleviate rural poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, since it is prohibitively
expensive to provide direct training to all the farmers in SSA, it is critically important to examine the
extent to which technologies taught to a small number of farmers disseminate to non-trained farmers.
This paper investigates the technology dissemination pathways among smallholder rice producers within
a rural irrigation scheme in Tanzania. As an innovative feature, we compare the performance of three cat-
egories of farmers: key farmers, who receive intensive pre-season training at a local training center;
intermediate farmers, who are trained by the key farmers; and other ordinary farmers. By collecting
and analyzing a unique five-year household-level panel data set, we estimate difference-in-differences
models to assess how the gap in performance evolve as the technologies spill over from the trained farm-
ers to the ordinary farmers. To disentangle the technology spillover process, we also examine the extent
to which social and geographical network with the key and intermediate farmers influences the adoption
of technologies by the ordinary farmers, by incorporating social relationship variables into spatial econo-
metric models. We found that the ordinary farmers who were a relative or residential neighbor of a key or
intermediate farmer were more likely to adopt new technologies than those who were not. As a result,
while the key farmers’ technology adoption rates rose immediately after the training, those of the
non-trained ordinary farmers caught up belatedly. As the technologies disseminated, the paddy yield
of the key farmers increased from 3.1 to 5.3 tons per hectare, while the yield of the ordinary farmers
increased from 2.6 to 3.7 tons per hectare. Our results suggest the effectiveness and practical potential
of farmer-to-farmer extension programs for smallholders in SSA as a cost effective alternative to the con-
ventional farmer training approach.
 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Technological change is a necessary step in the development
process. This is especially true for agricultural development in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where agricultural productivity has been
largely stagnant for many years. This is in sharp contrast to the
experience of Asia, where the Green Revolution has significantly
improved grain yields for the last several decades (Otsuka &
Kalirajan, 2005; Otsuka & Yamano, 2005). Among major cereals,
rice is considered to be one of the most promising crops to achieve
the African Green Revolution (Otsuka & Kijima, 2010; Seck, Tollens,Wopereis, Diagne, & Bamba, 2010; Tsusaka & Otsuka, 2013).
Fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding modern rice varieties devel-
oped in Asia have exhibited high yield potential and adaptability,
especially in irrigated areas in SSA (Nakano, Bamba, Diagne,
Otsuka, & Kajisa, 2013; Otsuka & Larson, 2013). Despite their sig-
nificant high yield potential, however, modern varieties, chemical
fertilizers, and improved agronomic practices have yet to be widely
adopted in SSA (Nakano, Kajisa, & Otsuka, 2015). Since such high-
potential technologies are already available, it is vitally important
to investigate how these technologies diffuse among small-scale
farmers for the improvement of rice productivity in SSA.
One potentially effective method to diffuse these new technolo-
gies is agricultural training (Anderson & Feder, 2007; Feder, Just, &
Zilberman, 1985; Otsuka & Larson, 2015). However, since it would
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rice cultivating technologies, examining the extent to which tech-
nologies taught to a small number of farmers disseminate to non-
trained farmers through social and neighborhood networks may
lead to more practical alternatives. Recently there has been
increasing empirical interest in social learning as a means of tech-
nology dissemination and some studies observe that social leaning
or ‘‘learning from others” plays a significant role in agricultural
technology adoption (Adegbola & Gardebroek, 2007; Bandiera &
Rasul, 2006; Case, 1992; Conley & Udry, 2010; Foster &
Rosenzweig, 1995; Maertens & Barrett, 2012; Moser & Barrett,
2006; Munshi, 2004). If social learning works effectively, new tech-
nologies taught to a small number of farmers should diffuse to
other farmers through social networks. However, the existing
empirical results on the diffusion of technologies from trained
farmers to non-trained farmers are mixed. In some studies, tech-
nologies did not spread from trained farmers to non-trained farm-
ers as effectively as expected (Feder, Murgai, & Quizon, 2004;
Tripp, Wijeratne, & Piyadasa, 2005), while other studies document
technology diffusion of the sort, though the extent of technology
spillover is not fully assessed (see Davis et al., 2012 for the review).
This paper investigates the effectiveness of farmer-to-farmer
training programs on rice cultivation technologies provided by
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Ministry
of Agriculture Training Institute (MATI) of Tanzania in 2009. JICA
and MATI sought to establish a farmer-to-farmer training scheme,
called TANRICE training,1 as a potentially cost-effective way of dis-
seminating agricultural technologies. As a first step, 20 farmers (des-
ignated ‘‘key farmers”) in a regional irrigation scheme were trained
on new cultivation technologies at a nearby training institute for
12 days before the start of the main crop season of 2009. Once the
season was underway, these key farmers, together with officers of
MATI and the village extension officer, held training sessions at a
demonstration plot. For these in-season training sessions, each key
farmer was responsible for inviting five additional farmers. The
invited farmers were referred to as ‘‘intermediate farmers” and were
expected to later train other non-trained ‘‘ordinary farmers.” This
training structure provided a unique opportunity to examine
whether technologies taught to a small number of selected farmers
would effectively disseminate to non-trained farmers.
We formulated two hypotheses: (1) First, since the key farmers
are the most intensively trained, they adopt the new technologies
and achieve higher yield rapidly after training, which expands the
yield gap between the key farmers and the others. Subsequently,
the intermediate farmers follow the key farmers, which narrows
the yield gap between the key and intermediate farmers and
widens the yield gap between the intermediary and ordinary farm-
ers. However, in the course of time, the ordinary farmers also catch
up by learning technologies from the key and intermediate farm-
ers, thereby closing the gaps in yield and technology adoption.
(2) Our second hypothesis is that the ordinary farmers learn new
technologies by communicating with the key and intermediate
farmers through social and geographical networks.
In order to examine these hypotheses, a five-year panel data set
was constructed to cover the period before and after TANRICE
training by combining survey data collected in 2010, 2011, and
2012, and recall data for 2008 and 2009 collected in 2010. In exam-
ining our first hypothesis, we employ fixed effects difference-in-
differences (FE-DID) and propensity score matching difference-
in-differences (PSM-DID) models to estimate the changes in impact
of TANRICE training on the adoption of technologies by the key,
intermediary, and ordinary farmers, and assess its effect on their1 The formal name for the TANRICE training program is Technical Cooperation in
Supporting Service Delivery Systems of Irrigated Agriculture (TC-SDIA).productivity. To address our second hypothesis, we utilize spatial
econometric method to investigate the facilitating role of the key
and intermediate farmers in the adoption of technologies by the
ordinary farmers. In the spatial models, we also control for possible
spillover effects among the ordinary farmers, since early adopters
may also influence the behavior of other ordinary farmers.
We found that the technology adoption rates, productivity, and
profitability of the key farmers rose immediately after training,
which resulted in a wider gap between the key farmers and the
other farmers in the initial stage of the program. In a remarkable
finding, however, the gap decreased within a matter of a few years
due to technology dissemination from the key and intermediate
farmers to the ordinary farmers. Over the course of the study, the
paddy yield of the key farmers increased from 3.1 tons per hectare
in the year preceding the training to a high of 5.3 tons per hectare,
while the yield of the ordinary farmers increased from 2.6 to 3.7
tons per hectare. These results suggest the effectiveness and poten-
tial of farmer-to-farmer agricultural training programs.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the study
site and data collection method, followed by descriptive analyses
in Section 3. Section 4 shows the FE-DID and PSM-DID analyses
of the impact of TANRICE training on the adoption of technologies
and the paddy yield for the three categories of farmers. Changes in
income and profit over time, for each category of farmers, are also
examined. In Section 5, spatial econometric analyses are performed
to examine the influential role of the key and intermediate farmers
in the technology adoption by the ordinary farmers through social
and geographical networks. Section 6 concludes the paper.2. Study site and data
2.1. Study site
The panel surveys were conducted among rice farming house-
holds in the Ilonga irrigation scheme in the Kilosa district, Moro-
goro region, of Tanzania. The irrigation scheme is located nearly
15 km from the nearest town of Kilosa. The main crop season in
this area runs from November to May, during which farmers pro-
duce rice on irrigated plots, while other crops such as maize, beans,
and vegetables are grown on rainfed upland plots. During the short
crop season from July to September, some farmers produce vegeta-
bles on the irrigated plots.
For farmers in the irrigated area, JICA provided the TANRICE
training on rice production technologies before and during the
main crop season from November 2008 to May 2009. (Hereinafter
this particular crop season will be referred to as the 2009 crop sea-
son; likewise, prior and subsequent crop seasons will be referenced
by the year in which they end.) The program covered several tech-
nologies: the use of modern varieties of rice, the application of
chemical fertilizer, improved bund construction, plot leveling,
and transplanting in rows. Improved bund construction entails pil-
ing soil solidly around the plots, while plot leveling involves flat-
tening the ground for better storage and equal distribution of
water on paddy fields. Transplanting seedlings in rows allows rice
growers to control plant density precisely and remove weeds
easily.
As noted earlier, intensive training was offered to 20 farmers,
called key farmers, at the nearby training institute (MATI Ilonga)
over a period of 12 days in November 2008 prior to the 2009 crop
season. Subsequently, during the 2009 main crop season, each key
farmer invited five intermediate farmers to training sessions held
at a demonstration plot within the irrigation scheme. The key
farmers and MATI jointly provided three-day training sessions to
the intermediate farmers at three different stages of farming—
nursery preparation, transplanting, and harvesting. Following
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ers were expected to disseminate technologies to the remaining
farmers (i.e., the ordinary farmers). One day of the in-field training
was open to attendance by all the farmers in the scheme, including
the ordinary farmers.
The key farmers were selected byMATI based on such criteria as
age, literacy, gender balance, residence within the irrigation
scheme, and the practice of rice farming, and were confirmed at
an all-villagers meeting. The intermediate farmers were selected
personally by the key farmers but not by MATI. Thus, the selection
of the key and intermediate farmers was purposive. Neither the
key nor the intermediate farmers were paid for attending the
training.
Our data show that only six households out of a total of 202 had
received any training in rice cultivation before TANRICE training
was implemented. From 2008 to 2012, there were only two other
interventions in the villages. The fertilizer subsidy program, in
which farmers can purchase chemical fertilizer at discounted
prices, was begun in 2009. The other intervention involved a ran-
domized controlled trial of micro credit conducted by the authors
in collaboration with a micro credit organization, BRAC in 2012.
Since participation in these programs was endogenously deter-
mined by farmers, participation is not an appropriate variable for
us to include unless properly treated for endogeneity bias. The
detailed impacts of these interventions are out of the scope of this
paper. Thus, in some analyses we present the results without
explicitly controlling for participation in these programs. Note,
however, that the main results of our analysis are robust to the
inclusion of farmer participation in the other programs.3 We can emphasize two relevant facts pertinent to possible concerns as to
omission of plots other than the most important plot. First, a considerable portion of
the sampled farmers own one plot only. These farmers do not cause the issue being
raised. Second, according to Santos and Barrett (2008), random sampling data
perform fairly well when ties between individuals are also constructed randomly. In
our context, a pair of plots being in the geographical neighborhood is not completely
random but much more exogenous than the case of social network formation. Hence,
although our plot data are not as perfect as those based on census data, we still
believe that they are fairly conducive to representing the population’s plot
neighborhood structure in our study area.
4 Note that the number of observations in 2008 and 2009 is smaller than in 2010
because the first round of the survey was conducted in 2010 and some of the
respondents did not cultivate the sample plots in 2008 and 2009.
5 The results of the attrition probit model are available upon request. In the
estimated model, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the sample was2.2. Data
Three rounds of the survey were implemented, in 2010, 2011,
and 2012. In the first survey, we randomly selected 208 farmers
from the farmer roster in the irrigation scheme and asked the
respondents to identify the most important rice plot for their liveli-
hood, which is hereafter referred to as the farmer’s ‘‘sample plot.”2
Farmers were asked in detail about rice cultivation on their sample
plot, which included detailed information on their use of labor, cap-
ital, and other inputs in 2010. Similar information on the sample plot
was collected for the 2011 and 2012 crop seasons as well. This
enables us to calculate not only paddy yield and technology adoption
but also the income and profit of rice cultivation for these three
years.
During the first survey in 2010, we collected relevant recall data
on rice cultivation on the sample plot for the 2008 and 2009 main
crop seasons, which were before and during the TANRICE training,
respectively. We observed that it was relatively easy for farmers to
recall their technology adoption and harvest for the previous two
years, but somewhat difficult for them to remember all the details
of input use and past prices. Thus, we restrict ourselves to using
recall data only for technology adoption and paddy yield, while
we rely on the 2010–2012 data for revenue, costs, income, profit,
and social network variables.
Recall data have been widely used to address various research
questions on smallholder agriculture in rural household surveys
(e.g., Erenstein, Farooq, Malik, & Sharif, 2008; Muller & Zeller,
2002). The potential for measurement error and other possible
biases has been examined comprehensively by, for instance, Dex
(1991) and Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001). The conclusions2 In our sample, key farmers were slightly more over-represented than were the
intermediary and ordinary, while the key farmers were also a minority. We have
examined the extent to which sample weight adjustment would affect our results.
This correction resulted in almost identical estimates, and thus we have safely
decided to omit this adjustment.from these studies are consistent: recall data are rather reliable
when the recall period is shorter, the activity being measured is
salient, and the practice is habitual over a long period. In our con-
text, the participation in smallholder farmers in agriculture tends
to be habitual over years and involve salient events that directly
determine their harvest and thus their livelihoods. Regarding the
recall period, Lunn (2010) admits that recall data are prone to mea-
surement errors when dating back for decades, and Powers, Goudy,
and Keith (1978) show that ten years’ recall data are unsuitable for
descriptive purposes. We assume that our use of recall for two
years is not extreme and will not significantly jeopardize the impli-
cations of our results. Another aspect to consider is the type of vari-
ables. Dex (1991) suggests that face-to-face surveys and aided
recall (lists of prompts) improve accuracy. The present survey
was carried out face-to-face and respondents were adequately
prompted.
We also asked farmers in detail about their relationship with
the key and intermediate farmers, including whether they are a
relative, residential neighbor, or a member of the same church or
mosque. The GPS coordinates of the sample plots were recorded
in order to calculate geographical distances among the sample
plots.3 Fig. 1 maps all the sample plots cultivated by the key, inter-
mediary, and ordinary farmers. In addition, the information on basic
household characteristics, including demography, land and asset
holdings, was collected during the first survey.
Data cleaning was performed by dropping those households
that took erroneous values in important variables for analyses
and those that did not grow rice on the sample plot. Those house-
holds that were interviewed in the first round of the survey but not
found in the second and third rounds were also omitted. This
resulted in 171 usable observations for 2008, 182 for 2009, 202
for 2010, 168 for 2011, and 167 for 2012.4 In order to examine
the seriousness of attrition bias, we estimated an attrition probit
model and confirmed that the attrition had occurred randomly with
respect to the observed set of variables.5 This implies that analysis
using the available observations (i.e., both balanced and unbalanced
panel data) will not suffer attrition bias. Thus, we basically use the
unbalanced panel data, which have more information due to the lar-
ger sample size, while we employ balanced panel data for our spatial
models as a computational requirement.63. Descriptive analyses
This section provides an overview of the transformation taking
place in the studied community by way of lucid descriptive statis-
tics. The arguments in this section will be more formally tested inobserved in the first round of the survey in 2010 but not in other years. We include all
the household characteristics used in our main analysis as independent variables.
Joint significance tests of all the independent variables failed to obtain statistical
significance at 10%. See Baulch and Quisumbing (2011) for more details on attrition
probit model.
6 We also confirmed that the main results of our analysis did not change when we
used balanced panel data.
Fig. 1. The map of sample plots. Sources: Adapted from the Survey Data and Esri Boundary Data.
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the basic household characteristics of the key, intermediary, and
ordinary farmers. The results of t-tests for continuous variables
and v2-tests for dummy variables used in comparisons of the key
and intermediate farmers to the ordinary farmers are shown in
the table, with asterisks indicating the associated level of signifi-
cance. As explained earlier, the selection of the key and intermedi-
ate farmers was purposive, and thus we observe some differences
in their characteristics and those of the ordinary farmers. We find
that the key farmers, on average, have larger numbers of household
family members, had slightly more years of education, are more
likely to be members of the same church or mosque as other key
or intermediate farmers, and have more relatives in the village.
The intermediate farmers are more likely to be older, have a female
head of household, and have larger plots in lowland areas. They are
also more likely to be residential neighbors of other key and inter-
mediate farmers. We will take these differences between the
trained farmers and the ordinary farmers into consideration in
our analyses.
Table 2 presents the changes in the average paddy yields and
the adoption of technologies by the key, intermediary, and ordi-
nary farmers. Again, the results of t-tests and v2-tests comparing
the key and intermediate farmers to the ordinary farmers are
shown. Note that the TANRICE training was conducted immedi-
ately before and during the 2009 main crop season. The table
shows that even prior to the training (i.e., in 2008), the key farmers
obtained a slightly higher yield than did the ordinary farmers, pre-
sumably due to the higher adoption rates of technologies. The key
farmers’ yield clearly increased soon after the training, from 3.1
tons per hectare in the pre-training year 2008 to 4.4 tons per hec-
tare in 2009, owing to their increased rates of technology adoption.They continued to achieve higher yields than the ordinary farmers,
reaching 5.3 tons per hectare in 2011 and 4.7 tons per hectare in
2012. The key farmers’ adoption rates for modern varieties,
improved bund construction, transplanting in rows, and chemical
fertilizer use also rapidly increased in 2009 and remained signifi-
cantly higher than the ordinary farmers until 2012, contributing
to a high yield in each year.
In contrast, the change in yield from the 2008 base year for the
intermediate farmers is not as rapid as that of the key farmers.
Even so, soon after receiving the training during the 2009 season,
the technology adoption rates for the intermediate farmers includ-
ing modern varieties, improved bund, and transplanting in rows
began increasing, eventually boosting the yield to a significantly
higher level than the ordinary farmers in 2011. These results indi-
cate that the effect of the training, both in terms of magnitude and
immediacy, is greater for the key farmers than for the intermediate
farmers; however, the intermediate farmers caught up with the
key farmers over the years.
The paddy yield for the ordinary farmers also rose, from 2.6 tons
per hectare in 2008 to 3.7 tons per hectare in 2012, though the
change was neither rapid nor drastic when compared with the
key and intermediate farmers. This increment can be attributed
to an increase in the use of chemical fertilizer and improved agro-
nomic practices. The belated, yet significant, technological changes
seen in the ordinary farmers indicate that technologies taught in
the TANRICE training spilled over from the key and intermediate
farmers to the ordinary farmers over the years. In fact, the yield
gap between the key and ordinary farmers ranged from 1.7 to 2.3
tons per hectare between 2009 and 2011, while it diminished to
one ton per hectare in 2012. These results are consistent with
our first hypothesis that the key farmers’ performance improves
Table 1
Household characteristics of key, intermediary, and ordinary farmers in 2010.
Key Intermediary Ordinary
=1 if female headed household 0.13
[0.34]
0.35**
[0.49]
0.18
[0.39]
Number of adult household members 3.25**
[1.69]
2.97
[1.28]
2.70
[1.25]
Age of household head 46.44
[9.88]
50.45*
[11.70]
46.74
[14.67]
Average years of schooling of adult household
members
7.29**
[1.38]
6.72
[1.31]
6.31
[2.25]
Size of sample plot (ha) 0.43
[0.15]
0.43
[0.18]
0.41
[0.22]
Size of owned plots in upland area (ha) 0.15
[0.51]
0.12
[0.28]
0.09
[0.23]
Size of owned plots in lowland area except
sample plot (ha)
0.32
[0.35]
0.38*
[0.44]
0.24
[0.45]
Value of household asset (million Tsh) 0.58
[0.37]
0.46
[0.47]
0.58
[1.06]
=1 if he/she is member of same
church/mosque as key or intermediate
farmers
1.00**
[0.00]
0.87
[0.34]
0.80
[0.40]
=1 if he/she is relative of key or intermediate
farmers
0.69
[0.48]
0.61
[0.50]
0.55
[0.50]
=1 if he/she is residential neighbor of key or
intermediate farmers
0.81
[0.40]
0.94**
[0.25]
0.68
[0.47]
Number of relatives in the village 13.25*
[11.50]
8.32
[7.63]
9.17
[11.22]
Irrigation block B 0.31
[0.48]
0.45
[0.51]
0.43
[0.50]
Irrigation block C 0.19
[0.40]
0.19
[0.40]
0.28
[0.45]
Irrigation block D 0.00
[0.00]
0.03
[0.18]
0.05
[0.21]
Observations 16 31 155
Standard deviations in brackets. ***Statistically significant at 1%, **5%, and *10% in a t-
test for continuous variables, or in a chi-square test for dummy variables, comparing
key and intermediate farmers to ordinary farmers.
7 Since the opportunity cost of family labor for African rural smallholders tends to
be lower than the hired wage (Tsusaka, Msere, Homann-KeeTui, Orr, & Ndolo, 2015),
profit tends to be underestimated, which partly explains the negative average profit
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farmers eventually catch up with the key farmers, resulting in a
smaller gap in yield and technology adoption in later years.
It is important to note that annual rainfall in the post-training
years was not higher than that in the pre-training year (2008)
except for year 2011, when farmers enjoyed abundant rainfall. In
particular, rainfall in the 2012 season was the lowest in several
years, which may have resulted in slightly lower adoption rates
for several technologies, including plot leveling and chemical fertil-
izer, than in 2011. Although admittedly the superior performance
in 2011 should be partly attributed to the abundant rainfall, the
intermediate and ordinary farmers still achieved high yields even
in 2012, the dry year. This fact suggests that the productivity
improvement reported in our study is not an accidental result of
rainfall conditions, but rather it is due to the adoption of the new
technologies taught in the training. Subsidized fertilizer use signif-
icantly declined in 2011 because of the delay in the delivery of
subsidy.
It would seem reasonable to question how the adoption of
yield-enhancing technologies, which entails extra costs, affects
household earnings from rice production. Table 3 summarizes
the average per-hectare gross output value, costs, income, and
profit from rice cultivation for the three categories of farmers, from
2010 to 2012. Gross output value includes self-consumed rice eval-
uated at the market price, as well as the value of rice sold. Income
is defined as gross output value minus the paid-out costs of hired
labor, rental machinery, draft animals, and other purchased inputs.
Profit is defined as gross output value minus the paid-out costs and
imputed costs of self-produced seeds, family labor, and owned
machinery and animals, evaluated at village market prices. Profit
thus can be interpreted as the return to land and managementpractices. Again, to underscore the difference among the various
categories of farmers, the t-test is used in comparisons of the key
and intermediate farmers to the ordinary farmers. As explained
earlier, these financial data are available only for 2010–2012, the
three-year period after the training.
The table shows that both gross output value and costs are gen-
erally increasing for all three categories of farmers during this
three-year post-training period, resulting in increasing income
and profit in 2011 and 2012. The key farmers achieved higher
income and profit than did the ordinary farmers in 2010 and
2011 because the key farmers adopted new technologies quickly
after the training. Both profit and income for the intermediary
and ordinary farmers also increased steadily from 2010 to 2012.
Especially, the ordinary farmers earned profit as high as USD 575
per hectare in 2012, which indicates no significant difference from
that of the key and intermediate farmers. Note again that rainfall in
2012 was scanty, suggesting that the increase in income and profit
for the ordinary farmers is not due to abundant rainfall. In any
event, the results indicate that the intermediary and ordinary
farmers succeeded in catching up to some degree with the key
farmers in terms of not only yield and technology adoption but also
income and profit, which is consistent with our first hypothesis.74. Effects of TANRICE training
4.1. Difference-in-differences
In order to evaluate the effects of TANRICE training on the adop-
tion of rice cultivation technologies and paddy yield, we estimate
difference-in-differences (DID) models with multiple time periods
and multiple treatment groups (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007;
Meyer, 1995) using our five-year panel data. The dependent vari-
ables are paddy yield (tons per hectare) and the following set of
technology adoption variables: a dummy variable for MV adoption,
the amount of chemical fertilizer use (kg per hectare), and dummy
variables for the adoption of improved bund construction, plot
leveling, and transplanting in rows, respectively.
It is vitally important to address two potential problems associ-
ated with our DID estimation framework. First, as discussed earlier,
the selection of the key and intermediate farmers was purposive,
which could be a cause for selection bias in estimating the effects
of the training on each category of farmers. Second, DID estimation
requires the common trends assumption (Lechner, 2010), which
essentially asserts that the group participating in the program
would have experienced the same change in the outcome variable
between the pre-program and the post-program periods as those
not participating. If this assumption holds and we can credibly rule
out any other over-time changes that may confound the treatment,
then the estimators are highly reliable. In order to circumvent
these problems, we employ two relevant measures, as illustrated
in the subsequent subsections, using: (1) a difference-in-
differences with household fixed effects model (FE-DID) and (2) a
propensity score matching difference-in-differences model (PSM-
DID).4.2. Estimation model 1: FE-DID
In FE-DID, we utilize the panel structure of our data set to con-
trol for unobservable time-invariant household-specific character-
istics which may influence participation in training as well as theobserved in 2010.
Table 2
Changes in paddy yield and technology adoption by training status (key and intermediate farmers).
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Pre-training During training Post-training
Key farmer
Paddy yield (tons/ha) 3.07*
[1.37]
4.40***
[1.32]
4.81***
[1.43]
5.34***
[2.36]
4.67**
[2.43]
Adoption rate of MVs (%) 46.15
[51.89]
69.23***
[48.04]
75.00***
[44.72]
54.44***
[46.92]
66.67***
[47.14]
Chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha) 63.42
[71.81]
115.82***
[86.07]
137.73***
[74.45]
178.26***
[89.52]
131.28***
[67.07]
Adoption rate of improved bund (%) 15.38**
[37.55]
23.08**
[43.29]
31.25***
[47.87]
40.00**
[50.71]
15.38
[37.55]
Adoption rate of plot leveling (%) 46.15
[51.89]
76.92
[43.85]
81.25
[40.31]
86.67
[35.19]
76.92
[43.85]
Adoption rate of transplanting in rows (%) 23.08
[43.85]
76.92***
[43.85]
93.75***
[25.00]
93.33***
[25.82]
92.31***
[27.74]
Subsidized fertilizer user (%) 0.00
[0.00]
30.77
[48.04]
50.00
[0.52]
66.67***
[48.8]
68.00***
[49.77]
Borrower from BRAC (%) – – – – 38.46*
[50.63]
Observations 13 13 16 15 13
Intermediate farmers
Paddy yield (tons/ha) 2.47
[1.13]
2.57
[1.39]
2.84
[1.39]
4.63***
[2.40]
3.93
[2.15]
Adoption rate of MVs (%) 30.43
[47.05]
44.44*
[50.64]
54.84**
[50.59]
34.38
[46.52]
49.48**
[48.97]
Chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha) 22.20**
[34.86]
49.00
[41.31]
79.05
[50.44]
103.85**
[63.94]
95.23
[58.63]
Adoption rate of improved bund (%) 13.04**
[34.44]
18.52**
[39.58]
22.58**
[42.50]
33.33**
[48.15]
33.33***
[48.15]
Adoption rate of plot leveling (%) 43.48
[50.69]
70.37
[46.53]
74.19
[44.48]
79.17
[41.49]
62.50
[49.45]
Adoption rate of transplanting in rows (%) 13.04
[34.44]
44.44***
[50.64]
64.52***
[48.64]
45.83**
[50.90]
58.33**
[50.36]
Subsidized fertilizer user (%) 4.35
[20.85]
22.22
[42.37]
38.71
[0.50]
20.83
[41.49]
21.25
[42.31]
Borrower from BRAC (%) – – – – 29.17
[46.43]
Observations 23 27 31 24 31
Ordinary farmers
Paddy yield (tons/ha) 2.57
[1.34]
2.67
[1.41]
2.53
[1.36]
3.58
[1.70]
3.67
[2.00]
Adoption rate of MVs (%) 26.67
[44.39]
26.76
[44.43]
32.26
[46.90]
23.62
[39.33]
32.85
[44.04]
Chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha) 46.52
[54.63]
58.31
[62.95]
69.72
[67.59]
85.79
[59.49]
83.16
[61.57]
Adoption rate of improved bund (%) 2.96
[17.02]
4.93
[21.73]
7.74
[26.81]
16.15
[36.95]
11.54
[32.07]
Adoption rate of plot leveling (%) 54.81
[49.95]
64.08
[48.15]
69.03
[46.39]
76.15
[42.78]
66.92
[47.23]
Adoption rate of transplanting in rows (%) 11.11
[31.54]
19.01
[39.38]
25.81
[43.90]
26.92
[44.53]
36.92
[48.45]
Subsidized fertilizer user (%) 11.11
[31.54]
21.13
[40.97]
32.26
[0.47]
26.15
[44.12]
26.68
[44.00]
Borrower from BRAC (%) – – – – 19.23
[34.17]
Observations 135 142 155 130 130
Annual rainfall (mm) 1027.4 869.2 917.3 1546.9 651.1
Rainfall during the main season (mm) 980.9 925.7 966.6 1326.0 783.6
Standard deviations in brackets. ***Statistically significant at 1%, **5%, and *10% in t-test comparisons of key and intermediate farmers to ordinary farmers (i.e., paddy yield, and
chemical fertilizer use) or in a chi-square test in the case of dummy variables (i.e., being a subsidized fertilizer user, borrowing money from BRAC, adoption rates of MVs,
improved bund, plot leveling, and transplanting in rows, respectively). Credit intervention by BRAC was made only in 2012.
Y. Nakano et al. /World Development 105 (2018) 336–351 341trends in the outcomes. The following econometric model is
estimated:
Yit ¼ aþ Ci þ bTt þ qTtSi þ uit ð1Þ
where Ci is the time-invariant household-specific effect for house-
hold i; Tt is a vector of four year dummies in year t, with a base
year of 2008; Si is a vector of two training status dummies (i.e.,key farmer and intermediate farmer dummies, with their base
group being ordinary farmers); TtSi is a vector of all pairwise
interactions between Tt and Si; and uit is the stochastic error term.
Note that in basic DID models, the terms of time-invariant train-
ing status dummies Si are included. In our case, however, this
term is absorbed by Ci, as we control for the household fixed
effects.
Table 3
Gross output value, costs, income and profit from rice cultivation (USD/ha) by training
status (2010–12).
2010 2011 2012
Key farmer
Gross output value (USD/ha) 1328.3***
[429.36]
1691.2***
[726.86]
1823.9**
[923.77]
Paid-out costs (USD/ha) 333.6
[170.8]
467.2
[238.3]
516.0
[271.3]
Imputed costs (USD/ha) 812.6
[259.9]
1168.0
[432.19]
1025.1
[542.24]
Income (USD/ha) 994.8***
[405.53]
1223.9***
[697.61]
1307.9
[917.16]
Profit (USD/ha) 515.7***
[424.47]
523.2***
[742.64]
798.8
[972.68]
Observations 16 15 13
Intermediate farmer
Gross output value (USD/ha) 786.2
[378.20]
1477.0***
[794.76]
1550.7
[802.73]
Paid-out costs (USD/ha) 257.2
[217.2]
437.8
[355.3]
463.4
[247.7]
Imputed costs (USD/ha) 916.6
[396.72]
1066.2
[450.49]
922.7
[235.55]
Income (USD/ha) 528.9
[394.21]
1039.2**
[745.08]
1087.3
[721.95]
Profit (USD/ha) 130.5
[547.2]
410.9**
[766.6]
628.0
[754.6]
Observations 31 24 24
Ordinary farmer
Gross output value (USD/ha) 718.3
[390.81]
1161.0
[554.37]
1500.8
[818.70]
Paid-out costs (USD/ha) 271.2
[217.5]
388.5
[263.8]
469.6
[287.3]
Imputed costs (USD/ha) 923.4
[406.88]
1095.2
[496.94]
925.7
[336.30]
Income (USD/ha) 447.1
[358.09]
772.5
[527.12]
1031.2
[742.99]
Profit (USD/ha) 205.1
[450.9]
65.8
[704.4]
575.1
[782.7]
Observations 155 130 130
Standard deviations in brackets. ***Statistically significant at 1%, **5%, and *10% in t-
test comparisons of key and intermediate farmers to ordinary farmers. Paid-out
costs include costs of current inputs, rental machinery, and hired labor. Imputed
costs include imputed costs of self-produced seeds, use of owned machinery, and
family labor evaluated at village market price, rental, and wage rate, respectively.
8 Dieye, Djebbari, and Barrera-Osorio (2014) point out that ignoring the spill-over
effect on program evaluation causes errors in the estimation results and that the sign
of the error depends on the direction of the program impact. In our case, we assume
that training of the key and intermediate farmers would generate positive externality
to the performance of the ordinary farmers through knowledge spillover. Therefore, q
is a conservative estimate of the impact of training on key and intermediate farmers.
Note, however, that we cannot totally deny the possibility that the adoption of
technology by the key and intermediate farmers has a negative impact on the
performance of the ordinary farmers through higher adoption costs caused by
increased input prices.
9 At present, PSM involving more than two treatment statuses simultaneously is an
ongoing area of research.
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pre-treatment. Thus, the interaction term coefficients q associated
with the interaction between the year dummies and training status
dummies are the DID estimates of interest to capture the gap in the
effects of the training between the trained (key and intermediate)
farmers and the ordinary farmers. The strength of this model is
that the term Ci absorbs the unobservable time-invariant house-
hold characteristics which are likely to affect participation in the
treatment. In other words, a potential selection bias is largely con-
trolled for. The year-specific effects represented by b capture the
changes in the outcome variables for the ordinary farmers. It is
assumed that these year dummies capture the indirect effects of
training on the ordinary farmers through knowledge spillover from
the trained farmers, in addition to other year-specific characteris-
tics such as weather.
It is important to note that in our case, q, the vector of DID esti-
mators, should not be interpreted as the ‘‘pure” impact of training,
i.e., the difference in growth between the factual and counterfac-
tual situations for the key and intermediate farmers with and with-
out the training intervention, respectively. Rather, q is designed to
capture the differences between the effect on the key and interme-
diate farmers and the effect on the ordinary farmers, since b cap-
tures the changes in performance of the ordinary farmers, which
incorporates the spillover from the key and intermediate farmers.Thus, as the ordinary farmers catch up with the key and interme-
diate farmers, q is expected to become smaller.8
4.3. Estimation model 2: PSM-DID
Matching techniques such as the propensity score matching
(PSM) create a control subsample with the same observable char-
acteristics as the treatment sample (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd,
1997). If the dynamics of the outcome variable are based on these
observable characteristics, this would eliminate the selection bias
and also enhance the credibility of the common trends assumption
of DID.
The matching methods are designed to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the average differ-
ence between the outcomes of training participants and their
counter-factual outcomes that would have been obtained if they
had not participated in the training. We estimate ATT separately
for the key and intermediate farmers. ATT for the key farmers is
estimated by matching the key farmers with the ordinary farmers,
while ATT for the intermediate farmers is estimated by matching
the intermediate farmers with the ordinary farmers.9 In either case,
ATT is formulated as follows:
ATT ¼ EðYið1Þ  Yið0ÞjDi ¼ 1Þ ð2Þ
where Di is a dummy variable indicating farmer i’s training status,
and Yi is the outcome variable of farmer i, as a function of Di. To
identify ATT, unconfoundedness and overlap are assumed
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The unconfoundedness assumption
implies that, given a set of observable characteristics Xi, potential
outcomes are independent of training status. The overlap assump-
tion ensures a positive probability of participation and non-
participation.
For matching, we employ PSM methods developed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), as this is the most commonly used
in the literature. Other matching methods include Mahalanobis
metric matching (Rubin, 1980) and inverse probability weighting
(IPW) (Hirano, Imbens, & Ridder, 2003). We estimate the propen-
sity score for participating in training based on the covariates in
2010 in light of the discussion on data collection in Subsection
2.2, assuming that the basic household characteristics had not
changed markedly in two years. The results of the propensity score
estimation are shown in Appendix Table 1. Given the unconfound-
edness and overlap assumptions, potential outcomes are indepen-
dent of treatment, conditional on the probability that the farmer
participates in training PðXiÞ, and hence ATT becomes:
ATT ¼ EðYið1ÞjDi ¼ 1; PðXiÞÞ  EðYið0ÞjDi ¼ 0; PðXiÞÞ ð3Þ
where an estimate of the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (3)
can be the average of actual outcomes of the participants, while an
estimate of the second term is the average outcome of the non-
participants who are matched with training participants according
to their propensity scores.
Since panel data are available in our study, we follow the PSM-
DID procedure proposed by Heckman et al. (1997) and applied by
Y. Nakano et al. /World Development 105 (2018) 336–351 343Todo and Takahashi (2013), to examine the treatment effect on the
over-time change in the outcome variables. Formally, the PSM-DID
estimator used in this study is defined as:
ATTDID ¼ N1
X
i2S1
DYið1Þ 
X
i2S0
WðPðXiÞ; PðXjÞ;DYjð0ÞÞ
" #
ð4Þ
where DYi  Yit  Yi2008 and t is the post-training year: 2009, 2010,
2011, or 2012. S1 and S0 are, collectively, the trained farmers and
the matched ordinary farmers, respectively. N is the number of
observations for the trained farmers. W is a weight determined by
the distance in propensity scores between the trained and the
matched ordinary farmer observations.
After trying different PSM algorithms, we chose kernel match-
ing (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) with the Epanechnikov kernel
function (DiNardo & Tobias, 2001) and the bandwidth (Pagan &
Ullah, 1999) of 0.06. The bootstrapped standard errors (Guan,
2003) with 500 repetitions of resampling are presented. We also
conduct balancing tests on the differences in means after match-
ing, as shown in Appendix Table 2. We find that no covariates
are significantly different between the key and ordinary farmers
and between the intermediary and ordinary farmers after match-
ing, suggesting that our matching procedure is successful in gener-
ating relevant comparison groups (Wooldridge, 2010).
If there are unobserved variables that affect assignment into
treatment and the dependent variable simultaneously, a hidden
bias might arise to which matching estimators are not robust. To
gauge the extent of this issue, we follow the bounding approach
proposed and applied by Rosenbaum (2002), DiPrete and Gangl
(2004), and Becker and Caliendo (2007). In short, the approach
allows us to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable
may influence the selection process to undermine the implications
of the matching analysis. Sig+ (p-value) is obtained from Wilcoxon
signed rank tests for the ATT while setting the level of hidden bias
to a certain value C, which reflects our assumption about unmea-
sured heterogeneity or endogeneity in treatment assignment
expressed in terms of the odds ratio of differential treatment
assignment due to an unobserved covariate. At each C, a hypothet-
ical significance level is calculated, which represents the bound on
the significance level of the treatment effect in the case of endoge-
nous self-selection into treatment status. By comparing the Rosen-
baum bounds at different levels of C, we can assess the strength
that unmeasured influences would require in order for the esti-
mated ATT to have arisen purely through selection effects. We pre-
sent the critical value of C that satisfies p < .10.
Lastly, when there are many time periods in panel data, the
standard errors for autocorrelation need to be adjusted (Bertrand,
Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). The easiest remedy is to cluster on
the household identifier which allows for arbitrary correlation of
the residuals among household-specific time series. Although there
are not many time periods in our study, we employed clustering to
obtain robust standard errors.
4.4. Regression results
Table 4 presents the results of the FE-DID estimation on paddy
yield and technology adoption. The year fixed effects are found to
be positive and significant in 2009–2012 for the use of chemical
fertilizer and the adoption of plot leveling and transplanting in
rows; in 2010–12, for improved bund construction; and in 2011–
2012, for paddy yield. The adoption of MVs also increased in
2012. This indicates a steady increase in the adoption of technolo-
gies as well as paddy yield for the ordinary farmers. We should
note that these positive coefficients should not be interpreted as
direct effects of TANRICE training on the performance of the ordi-
nary farmers. Rather, it captures the spillover effect from the keyand intermediate farmers to ordinary farmers, as well as year
specific effects. It is also important to note that this steady increase
in yield and technology adoption was not solely attributed to rain-
fall conditions, since the annual rainfall in 2008 was no lower than
in the following years.
For paddy yield, the DID estimates are significant for the key
farmers in 2009 and 2010, indicating that training for the key farm-
ers took immediate effect, which is consistent with our first
hypothesis. Our results suggest that the impact of training on key
farmers’ yield is larger by 1.2–1.7 tons per hectare as compared
to the yield of the ordinary farmers in 2009 and 2010, respectively.
This rapid increase in paddy yield can be attributed to the fast
adoption of technologies by the key farmers. The increase in chem-
ical fertilizer use by the key farmers vs. ordinary farmers is larger
by 41.8 kg in 2009, 56.3 kg in 2010, and 78.0 kg in 2011. The
increase in the adoption rate of transplanting in rows is also stea-
dily higher for the key farmers from 2009 to 2012.
A more striking finding, however, is the absence of significant
yield effects of the interaction term between the key farmer
dummy and the 2011 and 2012 dummies. This suggests that the
key farmers’ ‘‘yield premium” disappeared by 2011 and 2012.
Given that the performance of the ordinary farmers was steadily
improving over the period from 2010 through 2012, these results
support our first hypothesis that the ordinary farmers catch up
with the key and intermediate farmers because of knowledge spil-
lover from the two sources.
We do not observe significant coefficients for the interaction
terms of the intermediary and year dummies for paddy yield. On
the other hand, these coefficients are positive and significant for
chemical fertilizer use in 2010 and 2011 and transplanting in rows
in 2009 and 2010. The increase in chemical fertilizer use by the
intermediate farmers is larger than that of the ordinary farmers
by 22.4 kg in 2009 and 28.5 kg in 2010. The impact of training on
the adoption rate of transplanting in rows is also larger for the
intermediate farmers, by 21% in 2009 and 34% in 2010 (vs. the ordi-
nary farmers). These results imply that the intermediate farmers
adopted new technologies more rapidly than the ordinary farmers,
although their productivity increase is no faster than those of the
ordinary farmers. Although results are not shown, we obtained con-
sistent results even when we control for the participation in other
programs, including fertilizer subsidy and credit program provided
by BRAC. This suggests the robustness of our results.
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results of the PSM-DID
models on the impact of the key and intermediate farmers. Note
that since we estimate ATT by matching key with ordinary farmers
and intermediary with ordinary farmers, we do not obtain a year
trend in our PSM-DID models. Yet the coefficients for the key and
intermediate farmers in each year are comparable with those in
the FE-DID models. We obtained largely consistent results in both
the PSM-DID and FE-DID models. Namely, key farmers achieve
higher yield in years 2009 and 2010 by adopting new technologies,
while this ‘yield premium’ disappears in 2011 and 2012, suggest-
ing that the ordinary farmers are catching up in later years. We
do not observe a significant difference in paddy yield for the inter-
mediate farmers. Yet the adoption rate of transplanting in rows
increased more rapidly for the intermediate farmers than for ordi-
nary farmers. These results suggest the robustness of our results
even after we control for the selection of the key and intermediate
farmers and apply a relaxed assumption of common trend in DID
estimation.
Table 6 shows the results of the FE-DID estimation for gross
output value, costs, income, and profit per hectare from 2010 to
2012, with the base year being 2010. As noted previously, these
variables are available only for the post-training period. In this per-
iod from 2010 to 2012, the ordinary farmers enjoyed steady
increases in gross output value, income, and profit, as indicated
Table 4
Estimation results of difference-in-differences with household fixed effects models for paddy yield (tons/ha) and technology adoption (2008–12).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Paddy yield (tons/ha) MVs Chemical fertilizer
use (kg/ha)
Improved bund Plot leveling Transplanting in rows
Key * 2009 1.214***
[0.355]
0.233*
[0.121]
41.706**
[18.514]
0.057
[0.076]
0.204
[0.133]
0.480***
[0.179]
Key * 2010 1.662***
[0.459]
0.173
[0.161]
56.250***
[20.969]
0.057
[0.080]
0.158
[0.134]
0.594***
[0.129]
Key * 2011 1.135
[0.743]
0.138
[0.190]
78.019**
[33.401]
0.047
[0.188]
0.099
[0.204]
0.596***
[0.137]
Key * 2012 0.280
[0.651]
0.028
[0.175]
36.415
[26.750]
0.143
[0.147]
0.147
[0.181]
0.460***
[0.142]
Intermediary * 2009 0.226
[0.243]
0.079
[0.088]
3.640
[9.963]
0.030
[0.050]
0.145
[0.097]
0.213**
[0.094]
Intermediary * 2010 0.141
[0.329]
0.095
[0.116]
22.391*
[12.319]
0.014
[0.054]
0.111
[0.102]
0.340***
[0.105]
Intermediary * 2011 0.843
[0.525]
0.026
[0.117]
28.446*
[14.794]
0.006
[0.147]
0.100
[0.133]
0.139
[0.117]
Intermediary * 2012 0.108
[0.574]
0.037
[0.148]
17.926
[15.020]
0.093
[0.149]
0.023
[0.134]
0.173
[0.119]
Year 2009 0.119
[0.084]
0.002
[0.027]
10.691***
[3.801]
0.020
[0.016]
0.104***
[0.032]
0.059**
[0.024]
Year 2010 0.085
[0.107]
0.049
[0.036]
19.169***
[4.874]
0.030**
[0.015]
0.150***
[0.034]
0.122***
[0.033]
Year 2011 0.973***
[0.153]
0.022
[0.039]
36.652***
[5.617]
0.111***
[0.032]
0.232***
[0.052]
0.119***
[0.039]
Year 2012 1.101***
[0.178]
0.130***
[0.049]
34.333***
[6.152]
0.056*
[0.031]
0.133**
[0.061]
0.233***
[0.046]
Constant 2.653***
[0.073]
0.305***
[0.023]
47.778***
[2.943]
0.075***
[0.013]
0.524***
[0.025]
0.146***
[0.021]
Observations 891 891 891 891 891 891
R-squared 0.194 0.034 0.164 0.031 0.059 0.144
Number of households 202 202 202 202 202 202
2008–2012 unbalanced panel. Standard error clustered at household level in brackets. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1. Base year is 2008.
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behaviors in the same years (Table 4). Again, since the rainfall in
2012 was considerably lower than in the other years, these
increases in income and profit cannot be explained by weather
conditions. Furthermore, the most important finding here is that
for income and profit, none of the DID estimators for the key and
intermediate farmers is positive and statistically significant, indi-
cating that in these years, increase in income and profit were no
longer higher for the key and intermediate farmers than for the
ordinary farmers. This suggests that the ordinary farmers success-
fully caught up with the key and intermediate farmers not only in
terms of technology adoption and paddy yield but also income and
profit from rice cultivation. Although the results are not shown, we
applied the PSM-DID models as in Table 5 for these dependent
variables. We confirm that we still do not observe significant dif-
ferences between the key and ordinary farmers and between the
intermediary and ordinary farmers for gross output value, profit,
and income, suggesting the robustness of our argument.
5. The influence of key and intermediate farmers on technology
adoption by the ordinary farmers
5.1. Estimation model
We examine the effects of social network and spatial network
on the technology spillover from the trained farmers to the ordi-
nary farmers by constructing and incorporating social relationship
variables into the spatial econometric model. As we will elaborate
shortly, the social relationship variables are included to examine
the effects of social network, while the spatial model is used to
assess the effects of sample plot proximity to the key and interme-
diate farmers who were adopters. These variables of interest were
drawn from the 2010 data, as they were most reliable. As these
variables were assumed to be largely time-invariant, we pooledthe data from 2009 to 2012 to examine the influence of the social
network variables. In addition, the household fixed effects model is
also estimated for a robustness check on the time-variant vari-
ables. Year 2008 is excluded, as we include a dynamic variable with
a one-year lag and because it is a pre-training year.
The spatial model controls for a possible mutual spillover effect
among the ordinary farmers themselves, in view of the possibility
that the early adopters will influence the behavior of the other
ordinary farmers. In the following analysis, our primary interest
is in technology adoption by the ordinary farmers (i.e., the recipi-
ents of spillover), and thus the sample used in the estimations con-
sists only of the ordinary farmers.
The dependent variables are the set of technology adoption
variables: the dummy variable for MV adoption; the amount of
chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha); the dummy variables for improved
bund construction, leveling of plot, and transplanting in rows,
where each dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the correspond-
ing technology is adopted; and the paddy yield (tons/ha).
To estimate the effect of social network with the key and inter-
mediate farmers, we construct three binary variables that take the
value of 1 if the ordinary farmer has a key or intermediate farmer
as (1) a member of the same church or mosque, (2) a relative, or (3)
a residential neighbor. Since people cannot easily select or change
their relatives, their church or mosque membership rolls, or their
residential neighbors, these variables are assumed to be ade-
quately exogenous for qualitative assessment purposes, though
care must be taken in the quantitative interpretation of the coeffi-
cients. Furthermore, we attempt to control for certain other factors,
including the farmer’s own experience with successful adoption,
which is represented by the adoption dummy for the previous year
multiplied by the yield difference from the peer non-adopters’
average in the previous season. We have also included a dummy
for participation in the fertilizer subsidy program, a dummy for
borrowing money from BRAC, and added variables representing
Table 5
Estimation results of propensity score matching difference-in-differences models for paddy yield (tons/ha) and technology adoption (2008–12).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Paddy yield (tons/ha) MVs Chemical fertilizer use (kg/ha) Improved bund Plot leveling Transplanting in rows
Key * 2009 ATT 1.380*** 0.180 39.648** 0.022 0.200 0.553***
Bootstrap s.e. [0.415] [0.126] [19.227] [0.093] [0.175] [0.206]
Rosenboum odds ratio 4.85 – 1.40 – – 1.90
Key * 2010 ATT 2.157*** 0.212 52.904** 0.026 0.127 0.810***
Bootstrap s.e. [0.493] [0.180] [24.935] [0.094] [0.202] [0.138]
Rosenboum odds ratio 5.65 – 1.80 – – 3.75
Key * 2011 ATT 0.817 0.251 106.638** 0.161 0.149 0.5187***
Bootstrap s.e. [1.058] [0.213] [43.714] [0.248] [0.316] [0.170]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – 1.75 – – 2.90
Key * 2012 ATT 0.382 0.171 54.269 0.158 0.192 0.493**
Bootstrap s.e. [0.863] [0.206] [37.013] [0.227] [0.293] [0.229]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – – – – 1.70
Intermediary * 2009 ATT 0.148 0.058 8.901 0.051 0.172 0.250**
Bootstrap s.e. [0.259] [0.095] [10.572] [0.052] [0.107] [0.107]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – – – – –
Intermediary * 2010 ATT 0.074 0.150 21.166 0.082 0.174 0.389***
Bootstrap s.e. [0.326] [0.139] [14.610] [0.065] [0.112] [0.127]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – – – – 1.40
Intermediary * 2011 ATT 0.388 0.052 21.160 0.046 0.079 0.242*
Bootstrap s.e. [0.674] [0.131] [20.50] [0.154] [0.171] [0.131]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – – – – –
Intermediary * 2012 ATT 0.117 0.049 18.141 0.054 0.051 0.138
Bootstrap s.e. [0.560] [0.202] [20.314] [0.143] [0.198] [0.147]
Rosenboum odds ratio – – – – – –
2008–2012 unbalanced panel. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.We use an Epanechnikov kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.06 and obtain standard errors by bootstrapping with
500 replications.
Table 6
Estimation results of difference-in-differences with household fixed effect models for gross output value, costs, income, and profit from rice cultivation (USD/ha) (2010–12).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gross output value (USD/ha) Paid-out costs (USD/ha) Total costs (USD/ha) Income (USD/ha) Profit (USD/ha)
Key * 2011 83.754
[228.288]
4.682
[59.440]
153.857*
[80.742]
88.436
[230.186]
242.293
[233.703]
Key * 2012 307.942
[266.581]
28.578
[63.093]
200.147
[183.550]
279.363
[275.993]
479.510
[295.708]
Intermediary * 2011 293.602*
[167.525]
68.079
[77.634]
40.678
[87.160]
225.523
[183.052]
266.200
[179.957]
Intermediary * 2012 86.989
[193.590]
12.507
[49.620]
27.169
[86.470]
99.496
[177.877]
126.665
[175.342]
Year 2011 445.156***
[47.998]
118.464***
[20.813]
56.041
[44.565]
326.692***
[47.325]
270.651***
[64.266]
Year 2012 793.653***
[66.436]
202.346***
[23.383]
193.550***
[42.145]
591.306***
[60.194]
784.856***
[71.932]
Constant 775.612***
[27.949]
272.877***
[10.387]
635.416***
[18.168]
502.734***
[26.854]
132.681***
[31.240]
Observations 538 538 538 538 538
R-squared 0.373 0.247 0.107 0.259 0.299
Number of households 202 202 202 202 202
2010–2012 unbalanced panel. Standard error clustered at household level in brackets. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1. Base year is 2010. Paid-out costs include costs of current
inputs, rental machinery, and hired labor. Total costs include paid out costs and imputed costs of self-produced seeds, use of owned machinery, and family labor evaluated at
village market price, rental, and wage rate, respectively.
10 For details of the spatial model derivation, see Anselin (2010), for example.
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household characteristics, as shown in Table 7.
In order to estimate the influence of geographical proximity to
the key and intermediate farmers, we included the spatial
weighted average of the key and intermediate farmers’ outcome
variables, using the inverse squared distance from each ordinary
farmer’s plot as weights. The distance between plots is calculated
from the GPS coordinates collected in the 2010 survey. In addition,
we need to carefully consider spatial interdependence in both the
dependent variables and error terms (e.g., Anselin, 1988; LeSage &
Pace, 2009; Tsusaka, Kajisa, Pede, & Aoyagi, 2015). In our context,
the former can be interpreted as the learning effect among vicinal
ordinary farmers, while the latter is regarded as the resemblance inadoption behavior arising from common unobservable conditions
such as soil quality and water availability due to the proximity of
the sample plots. Specifically, we estimate a spatial autoregressive
disturbance (SARAR) model (LeSage & Pace, 2009). In this model,
the spatial dependence in both dependent variables and the distur-
bance term is controlled for.10 Let K, I, and O represent the number
of observations for the key, intermediary, and ordinary farmers,
respectively. The main estimation model (i.e., the pooled specifica-
tion) is expressed as follows:
Yo ¼ Soaþ cWkYk þ dWiYi þ qWoYo þ Xobþ uo ð5Þ
Table 7
Spatial estimation of technology adoption and paddy yield (tons/ha).
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MV MV Chemical fertilizer
use
Chemical fertilizer
use
Improved
bund
Improved
bund
Plot
leveling
Plot
leveling
Transplant in
rows
Transplant in
rows
Paddy
yield
Paddy
yield
Own successful experience of past adoption 0.003
[0.022]
7.716***
[1.937]
0.002
[0.038]
0.011
[0.020]
0.125***
[0.029]
Weighted average of the technology adoption by the key farmers 0.010
[0.046]
0.011
[0.044]
0.017
[0.040]
0.037
[0.027]
0.084*
[0.051]
0.109**
[0.056]
0.106
[0.103]
0.073
[0.095]
0.008
[0.097]
0.043
[0.098]
0.122*
[0.063]
0.135**
[0.064]
Weighted average of the technology adoption by the intermediate
farmers
0.037
[0.059]
0.038
[0.059]
0.080
[0.101]
0.101
[0.081]
0.035
[0.048]
0.015
[0.051]
0.010
[0.086]
0.002
[0.082]
0.034
[0.070]
0.018
[0.072]
0.133***
[0.046]
0.131***
[0.046]
=1 if he/she is a member of the same church/mosque as key or
intermediate farmers+
0.020
[0.062]
0.025
[0.061]
8.226
[7.601]
10.573
[8.195]
0.006
[0.043]
0.008
[0.044]
0.134*
[0.070]
0.127*
[0.070]
0.080
[0.063]
0.077
[0.065]
0.160
[0.217]
0.147
[0.218]
=1 if he/she is a relative of key or intermediate farmers+ 0.104**
[0.044]
0.102**
[0.043]
0.036
[5.450]
1.606
[5.847]
0.062**
[0.031]
0.062**
[0.032]
0.136***
[0.050]
0.130***
[0.049]
0.092*
[0.047]
0.095**
[0.048]
0.152
[0.155]
0.158
[0.156]
=1 if he/she is a residential neighbor of key or intermediate farmers+ 0.056
[0.051]
0.058
[0.051]
8.119
[6.448]
12.837*
[7.000]
0.029
[0.036]
0.020
[0.037]
0.095
[0.059]
0.087
[0.058]
0.034
[0.053]
0.051
[0.054]
0.117
[0.183]
0.162
[0.183]
Number of relatives in the village 0.000
[0.002]
0.000
[0.002]
0.504**
[0.211]
0.424*
[0.229]
0.001
[0.001]
0.001
[0.001]
0.002
[0.002]
0.002
[0.002]
0.001
[0.002]
0.001
[0.002]
0.007
[0.006]
0.006
[0.006]
Fertilizer subsidy program 0.027
[0.045]
54.015***
[6.199]
0.072**
[0.036]
0.068
[0.058]
0.049
[0.054]
0.302*
[0.165]
BRAC borrower 0.002
[0.078]
20.357*
[10.399]
0.005
[0.062]
0.111
[0.105]
0.119
[0.095]
0.266
[0.281]
Female headed household 0.047
[0.045]
0.049
[0.044]
2.743
[6.090]
1.728
[5.707]
0.052
[0.034]
0.055
[0.036]
0.164***
[0.057]
0.147***
[0.056]
0.041
[0.052]
0.034
[0.052]
0.050
[0.162]
0.071
[0.162]
Number of adult members squared 0.028**
[0.013]
0.028**
[0.013]
1.348
[1.588]
1.817
[1.656]
0.006
[0.009]
0.005
[0.009]
0.002
[0.015]
0.002
[0.015]
0.023*
[0.013]
0.019
[0.014]
0.082*
[0.046]
0.082*
[0.046]
Number of adult household members 0.159*
[0.089]
0.162*
[0.088]
14.616
[10.895]
16.255
[11.629]
0.029
[0.062]
0.027
[0.064]
0.019
[0.101]
0.017
[0.100]
0.166*
[0.092]
0.143
[0.094]
0.484
[0.312]
0.474
[0.313]
Age of household head squared /1000 0.064
[0.099]
0.058
[0.094]
6.108
[13.222]
10.573
[12.652]
0.061
[0.072]
0.050
[0.072]
0.214*
[0.124]
0.219*
[0.121]
0.261**
[0.111]
0.230**
[0.113]
0.462
[0.355]
0.361
[0.351]
Age of household head 0.006
[0.010]
0.005
[0.010]
0.239
[1.369]
0.003
[1.320]
0.009
[0.007]
0.008
[0.008]
0.023*
[0.013]
0.023*
[0.012]
0.024**
[0.012]
0.021*
[0.012]
0.069*
[0.037]
0.059
[0.036]
Years of education squared/1000 0.333
[1.980]
0.349
[1.880]
72.685
[256.388]
181.620
[224.953]
0.213
[1.401]
0.493
[1.479]
1.199
[2.409]
1.009
[2.323]
1.386
[2.173]
0.855
[2.193]
7.000
[7.077]
6.180
[7.111]
Average years of schooling of adult household members 0.004
[0.022]
0.004
[0.021]
0.246
[2.925]
1.195
[2.551]
0.011
[0.016]
0.014
[0.017]
0.019
[0.027]
0.016
[0.026]
0.016
[0.025]
0.015
[0.025]
0.056
[0.079]
0.048
[0.079]
Size of sample plot (ha) 0.175*
[0.105]
0.178*
[0.104]
11.498
[12.871]
2.464
[13.311]
0.031
[0.072]
0.036
[0.075]
0.128
[0.122]
0.139
[0.119]
0.067
[0.112]
0.098
[0.114]
1.275***
[0.363]
1.251***
[0.365]
Size of owned plots in upland area (ha) 0.007
[0.088]
0.016
[0.087]
4.920
[10.946]
16.240
[11.956]
0.114*
[0.062]
0.098
[0.062]
0.153
[0.102]
0.113
[0.100]
0.156*
[0.091]
0.158*
[0.092]
0.124
[0.304]
0.235
[0.300]
Size of owned plots in lowland area except sample plot (ha) 0.100**
[0.048]
0.097**
[0.048]
1.890
[6.203]
2.424
[6.567]
0.037
[0.035]
0.035
[0.036]
0.004
[0.057]
0.010
[0.056]
0.038
[0.053]
0.005
[0.053]
0.242
[0.172]
0.272
[0.172]
Value of household asset (million Tsh) 0.049
[0.034]
0.050
[0.033]
1.689
[4.259]
5.873
[4.459]
0.037
[0.024]
0.033
[0.025]
0.104***
[0.039]
0.098**
[0.039]
0.034
[0.036]
0.054
[0.037]
0.307**
[0.121]
0.326***
[0.121]
year = 2010 0.000
[0.026]
0.003
[0.025]
7.168
[5.613]
1.167
[3.605]
0.007
[0.021]
0.000
[0.025]
0.032
[0.041]
0.033
[0.036]
0.050
[0.043]
0.034
[0.043]
0.001
[0.098]
0.032
[0.098]
year = 2011 0.005
[0.026]
0.003
[0.026]
1.850
[7.717]
0.337
[5.145]
0.024
[0.024]
0.043
[0.029]
0.099**
[0.050]
0.062
[0.048]
0.039
[0.041]
0.033
[0.042]
0.342*
[0.175]
0.387**
[0.175]
year = 2012 0.007
[0.037]
0.003
[0.033]
4.794
[6.926]
0.011
[4.252]
0.003
[0.031]
0.004
[0.028]
0.024
[0.049]
0.031
[0.039]
0.104*
[0.056]
0.069
[0.050]
0.089
[0.176]
0.130
[0.160]
Constant 0.515**
[0.210]
0.498**
[0.207]
12.392
[29.722]
21.434
[26.025]
0.211
[0.164]
0.229
[0.174]
0.114
[0.292]
0.310
[0.276]
0.361
[0.276]
0.391
[0.282]
2.440***
[0.937]
2.500***
[0.943]
Irrigation block dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Spatial lag 1.267***
[0.090]
1.267***
[0.087]
0.688***
[0.136]
1.041***
[0.141]
0.749***
[0.161]
0.560***
[0.201]
0.299
[0.219]
0.590**
[0.230]
0.489***
[0.167]
0.566***
[0.180]
0.976***
[0.139]
0.938***
[0.138]
Spatial error 1.187***
[0.196]
1.188***
[0.195]
0.734***
[0.192]
2.008***
[0.207]
0.752***
[0.186]
0.542**
[0.217]
0.516**
[0.204]
0.660***
[0.173]
0.500***
[0.176]
0.512***
[0.167]
0.951***
[0.196]
0.930***
[0.198]
Joint test for social relationship variables (+) (chi-square) 5.93 5.82 5.36 9.25** 4.13 3.89 10.29** 9.53** 9.34** 10.52** 3.36 4.16
Standard errors in brackets. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
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where
Yo: The O-by-1 vector of outcome variables for O ordinary
farmers;
So: The O-by-3 matrix of the three social relationship dummy
variables for O ordinary farmers;
Xo: The O-by-m matrix of m household characteristics and
other control variables for O ordinary farmers;
Yk: The K-by-1 vector of adoption of technologies by K key
farmers;
Yi: The I-by-1 vector of adoption of technologies by I intermedi-
ate farmers;
Wo: The O-by-O weight matrix representing the quadratic dis-
tance decay among O ordinary farmers (row standardized);
Wk: The O-by-K weight matrix representing the quadratic dis-
tance decay between O ordinary farmers and K key farmers
(row standardized);
Wi: The O-by-I weight matrix representing the quadratic dis-
tance decay between O ordinary farmers and I intermediate
farmers (row standardized);
uo: The O-by-1 vector of error term that may have a spatial
process;
eo: The O-by-1 vector of random error term assumed to be i.i.d.
with constant variance.
The main variables of interest in this model are So, to represent
the social network, and WkYk, WiYi, and WoYo, to represent the
geographical network. Accordingly, coefficient a indicates the
social network effects, while c and d indicate the spatial network
effects from the key and intermediate farmers, respectively. The
coefficient q captures the spillover from nearby the ordinary farm-
ers. Spatially correlated effects of unobservable factors in the
neighborhood are captured by the coefficient k.11 Note that Eq.
(5) is a structural form equation because Yo and uo enter on both
sides. In the estimation process, we follow the Generalized 2SLS
strategy proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998), refined by Lee
(2003), and applied by Kelejian and Prucha (2008), Bramoullé et al.
(2009) and Ward and Pede (2014).12 This procedure yields an
asymptotically optimal IV estimator when the errors are i.i.d. and
reduces to a two-step estimation method in our case, where WoSo,
WoXo, W
2
oSo and W
2
oXo are used as instruments.
13 Note that Eq. (5)
represents a spatial LPM (linear probability model) in the cases of
binary outcomes. According to Table 8.9 in Beron and Vijverberg
(2004), spatial LPM yields conservative estimates of q and k as com-
pared to spatial Probit estimators.145.2. Estimation results
Table 7 shows the results of the spatial panel estimations for the
adoption of technologies by the ordinary farmers. The models (1),
(3), (5), (7), (9), and (11) include the ‘own experience’, fertilizer
subsidy, and borrowing money from BRAC variables. Since these
variables can be endogenous, we also show the results without11 For detailed discussions of correlated spatial effects and the associated estimation
problems known as the reflection problem, see the pioneer work by Manski (1993). To
ensure the identification of spatial effects in the presence of correlated social effects,
we also conducted the test for necessary and sufficient conditions for identification
proposed by Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and passed it with rank 4, which
means that the matrices I. Wo W2o . and W
3
o are linearly independent.
12 Spatial models need to be estimated by MLE, GMM, or Generalized 2SLS, as use of
OLS regressions would suffer severe endogeneity bias.
13 The model estimation was handled by STATA codes as illustrated by Drukker,
Prucha, and Raciborski (2013).
14 For the spatial specifications including spatial errors, methods of standard error
clustering are not clearly available to date.these variables. Note, however, that we obtained largely consistent
results in models both with and without these variables.
The dummy variable for being a relative of key or intermediate
farmers has positive coefficients for the adoption of improved
bund, plot leveling, and transplanting in rows. The same coefficient
was negative for the adoption of MVs, for which we do not have a
convincing interpretation. Note, however, that the joint signifi-
cance tests of the social network variables for MVs are insignifi-
cant, while those for plot leveling and transplanting are
statistically significant, as shown in the last line of the table. Being
members of the same church or mosque has a positive coefficient
for the adoption of plot leveling. Overall, these results suggest that
interaction with the key and intermediate farmers through social
networks plays a significant role in technology adoption by the
ordinary farmers.
On the other hand, we do not find any positive effect of plot
proximity to adopting key or intermediate farmers’ on the adop-
tion by the ordinary farmers. Intriguingly, however, the spatial
lag term is generally significant, which implies that mutual learn-
ing among the ordinary farmers has a positive influence on tech-
nology adoption. This mixed result can be attributable to the
different geographical ‘densities’ of the key, intermediary, and
ordinary farmers. Since there are only a few key and intermediate
farmers in the entire irrigation scheme, while there are many ordi-
nary farmers, farmers may have more opportunities to learn from
nearby the ordinary farmers than the key or intermediate farmers,
whose presence is relatively sparse within the irrigation scheme.
We have no convincing explanation for the negative and significant
coefficient of the weighted average of the key and intermediate
farmers’ adoption on improved bund and paddy yield. Note, how-
ever, that we do not observe this negative impact when we control
for household fixed effects as shown in Table 8.
Own successful experience of past adoption has a positive and
significant coefficient for chemical fertilizer use and the adoption
of transplanting in rows, suggesting that farmers also make their
adoption decision by learning from their own past experience.
The coefficient for receiving the fertilizer subsidy has a positive
and significant coefficient for fertilizer use and paddy yield, sug-
gesting that the availability of cheaper fertilizer may contribute
to increased fertilizer use and enhanced paddy yield. Borrowing
money from BRAC has positive impact on the use of chemical fer-
tilizer but has no impact on the adoption of other technologies.
This implies that there is no serious credit constraint for the adop-
tion of agronomic practices except for chemical fertilizer use. Being
a female household head negatively affects the adoption of plot
leveling. Size of sample plot has a negative coefficient for paddy
yield, which is consistent with the well-known inverse relationship
between agricultural productivity and plot size due to the family
labor constraint (Otsuka, 2007). However, number of family mem-
ber has no clear positive impact while neither plot size nor land
holdings has negative relationship with the adoption of technolo-
gies, except for the coefficient of the size of owned plot in upland
area being negative for the adoption of transplanting in rows.
These results make it less clear if there is any severe labor con-
straint for the adoption of new technologies. Size of plot and size
of owned plots in the lowland area have positive and significant
coefficients for the adoption of MVs. This may be because farmers
with large land holdings are able to take the risk of adopting new
varieties.
In Table 8, we summarize the results of our spatial panel estima-
tion with household fixed effects. The basic estimation strategy is
the same as the models shown in Table 7, except that household
fixed effects are included, and thus, all the time-invariant
household characteristics are omitted from the estimation. We
obtained largely consistent results regarding the impact of plot-
neighboring farmers in both models. The weighted average of
Table 8
Spatial estimation of technology adoption and paddy yield (tons/ha) with household fixed effects.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
MV MV Chemical
fertilizer
use
Chemical
fertilizer
use
Improved
bund
Improved
bund
Plot
leveling
Plot
leveling
Transplant
in rows
Transplant
in rows
Paddy
yield
Paddy
yield
Own successful experience of past
adoption
0.071**
[0.033]
2.990
[2.568]
0.047
[0.044]
0.027
[0.027]
0.030
[0.037]
Weighted average of the adoption of
technology by neighbor key farmers
0.073
[0.079]
0.086
[0.088]
0.008
[0.047]
0.010
[0.031]
0.045
[0.064]
0.069
[0.117]
0.178
[0.207]
0.004
[0.102]
0.023
[0.088]
0.042
[0.043]
0.051
[0.103]
0.032
[0.102]
Weighted average of the adoption of
technology by neighbor intermediate
farmers
0.079
[0.092]
0.068
[0.103]
0.108
[0.148]
0.046
[0.150]
0.051
[0.057]
0.017
[0.060]
0.005
[0.182]
0.012
[0.096]
0.067
[0.098]
0.006
[0.059]
0.097
[0.068]
0.068
[0.069]
Fertilizer subsidy program 0.135**
[0.055]
48.160***
[7.131]
0.048
[0.044]
0.015
[0.071]
0.028
[0.057]
0.103
[0.204]
Borrowing from BRAC 0.216**
[0.092]
35.050***
[11.100]
0.113
0.116
0.037
[0.091]
0.152
[0.335]
year = 2010 0.044
[0.045]
0.054
[0.056]
7.227
[6.395]
2.404
[4.238]
0.004
[0.023]
0.000
[0.027]
0.042
[0.054]
0.013
[0.017]
0.001
[0.040]
0.018
[0.019]
0.045
[0.133]
0.028
[0.114]
year = 2011 0.017
[0.046]
0.016
[0.052]
0.346
[8.879]
8.301
[5.765]
0.022
[0.030]
0.014
[0.081]
0.151**
[0.063]
0.032
[0.044]
0.012
[0.042]
0.033
[0.023]
0.528*
[0.293]
0.327
[0.408]
year = 2012 0.130**
[0.059]
0.152*
[0.087]
1.942
[8.071]
5.598
[4.756]
0.032
[0.037]
0.015
[0.043]
0.023
[0.065]
0.006
[0.024]
0.005
[0.071]
0.053
[0.038]
0.435
[0.289]
0.246
[0.405]
Spatial lag 0.127
[0.172]
0.226
[0.581]
0.662**
[0.272]
1.549***
[0.358]
0.805***
[0.242]
0.923
[0.963]
0.055
[0.244]
1.291***
[0.304]
0.979***
[0.283]
1.257***
[0.193]
0.576**
[0.254]
0.783*
[0.407]
Spatial error 0.077
[0.309]
0.038
[0.316]
0.378
[40.040]
1.295
[39.160]
0.573**
[0.252]
0.387
[0.259]
0.083
[0.399]
1.901***
[0.346]
0.469
[0.316]
2.086***
[0.289]
0.365
[1.173]
0.557
[1.156]
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Standard error in brackets. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.
348 Y. Nakano et al. /World Development 105 (2018) 336–351technology adoption by the key and intermediate farmers has no
significant impact on the adoption of technologies by the ordinary
farmers. On the other hand, the spatial lag terms which capture
the spill-over effects from neighboring ordinary farmers are signif-
icant for the adoption of chemical fertilizer use, improved bund,
plot leveling and transplanting in rows, as well as paddy yield.
These results consistently suggest that plot proximity to ordinary
adopters ismore important than proximity to adopting key or inter-
mediate farmers.15 This observation is consistent with Tsusaka, Velasco, and Yamano (2015), who
described the time it takes for a majority of the rural population to adopt agricultural
technologies in five south Asian countries.6. Conclusion
While the adoption and dissemination of agricultural technolo-
gies among small-scale farmers are of paramount importance in
achieving an African Green Revolution, little work has been done
to determine whether or to what extent technologies can dissem-
inate from a small number of selected and trained farmers to non-
trained farmers within rural farming communities. This paper
investigated the outcome of a farmer-to-farmer training program
with a particular focus on how the gap in adoption of rice cultiva-
tion technologies and paddy yield evolved due to technology spil-
lover within an irrigated rice farming community in Tanzania. Our
results showed that new technologies were first adopted by the
trained key and intermediate farmers and that, as a result, the yield
gap initially widened between the trained farmers and the non-
trained ordinary famers. However, in the course of time, the tech-
nologies diffused gradually from the key and intermediate farmers
to the ordinary farmers. Consequently, the paddy yield of the key
farmers substantially increased from 3.1 tons per hectare to 5.3
tons per hectare, while that of the ordinary farmers was noticeably
boosted from 2.6 tons per hectare to 3.7 tons per hectare, with a
time lag. This suggests that society’s aggregate gain from an
enhancement of the performance of the ordinary farmers would
be substantial, given the dominance of the ordinary farmers in
the population.
A notable implication of our results pertains to the channels of
technology spillover from trained farmers to non-trained farmers.
It was found that a social relationship with the key and intermedi-ate farmers contributed to the process of technology adoption by
the ordinary farmers, which is consistent with Lambrecht,
Vanlauwe, Merckx, and Maertens (2014), who point out the impor-
tance of social interaction in the awareness and adoption of new
technologies. By contrast, we observed only a limited impact of
plot proximity to trained farmers, while plot proximity to other
ordinary farmers exhibited a positive and significant effect. These
results suggest that technologies first disseminate from the trained
farmers to those ordinary farmers who have social ties with the
trained farmers, and then further disseminate among the non-
trained farmers through plot proximity.
Overall, our paper provides support for farmer-to-farmer exten-
sion strategies, provided that the lead farmers selected by the com-
munity receive an intensive training program on production
technologies. Given that extension officers or aid agencies can train
only a limited number of farmers at a time, farmer-to-farmer
extension offers a reasonable option for technology dissemination
programs. This is in line with Krishnan and Patnam (2013), who
found in Ethiopia that, while the initial impact of training by exten-
sion agents was high, the importance of learning from neighbors
increased over time in the adoption of fertilizer and improved
seeds. Maertens and Barrett (2012) also point out that ordinary
farmers receive information from progressive farmers. These
results are consistent with our finding that intensive training to
selected farmers can enhance the performance of other farmers.
Within our study site, it took a few years for non-trained farm-
ers to adopt newly introduced technologies15 and increase their
productivity through social learning from trained farmers and neigh-
borhood peer learning. This implies that the impact evaluation of a
farmer-to-farmer extension program should be conducted not in
the short-run but by allowing at least a few years’ time to pass in
order to fully capture the impact of spillover from trained farmers
to non-trained farmers.
Y. Nakano et al. /World Development 105 (2018) 336–351 349One notable limitation of this paper is that it does not provide a
formal impact assessment of the training program. Rather, its focus
is on estimating how the performance gap between trained and
non-trained farmers shifted over time due to the expected technol-
ogy spillover to the ordinary farmers. It should also be noted that
profit data were unavailable for the years 2008 and 2009, which
preceded or included the training period. Hence, a formal
benefit-cost analysis incorporating profitability with and without
the training program was not possible. This should be the subject
of future research that could potentially strengthen the evidence
of the present paper.
The applicability of this study’s findings to other farming com-
munities will clearly be affected by the type of constraints facing
the community’s farmers. These would include knowledge con-
straints, capital constraints, labor constraints, etc. Based on our
hands-on experience with, and insights into our study site, it is
apparent that inadequate extension services are a significant cause
of low adoption of production technologies. Although capital and
labor admittedly play a role in the adoption of new technologies,
proper training in their use is crucial. While improved seeds and
fertilizers are available in the markets of our study site, their adop-
tion must be accompanied by appropriate agronomic practices and
thus require training for successful use. It is also important to note
that whether this type of farmer-to-farmer extension can work
effectively may depend on geographical conditions. Since our study
site is a relatively small irrigation scheme, whether a similar typeAppendix Table 1
Probit estimation results of being key or intermediate farmers.
=1 if female headed household
Number of adult household members
Number of adult members squared
Age of household head
Age of household head squared/1000
Average years of schooling of adult household members
Years of education squared/1000
Size of sample plot (ha)
Size of owned plots in upland area (ha)
Size of owned plots in lowland area except sample plot (ha)
Value of household asset (million Tsh)
=1 if he/she is member of same church/mosque as key or intermediate farmers
=1 if he/she is relative of key or intermediate farmers
=1 if he/she is residential neighbor of key or intermediate farmers
Number of relatives in the village
Irrigation block B
Irrigation block C
Irrigation block D
Constant
Observations
Standard errors in brackets. ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1.of farmer-to-farmer extension can work in different geographical
settings such as spatially scattered communities or mountainous
areas should be the subject of future investigation.Acknowledgements
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Key farmer Intermediate farmer
0.382
[0.698]
0.636*
[0.329]
0.858
[0.695]
0.435
[0.476]
0.123
[0.088]
0.051
[0.065]
0.309*
[0.171]
0.215**
[0.099]
2.954*
[1.712]
2.002**
[0.975]
0.809
[0.838]
0.705
[0.491]
49.063
[58.423]
57.941
[38.159]
0.083
[0.871]
0.401
[0.727]
2.065
[1.804]
0.261
[0.623]
0.115
[0.505]
0.000
[0.306]
0.067
[0.707]
0.340
[0.268]
 0.225
[0.504]
0.158
[0.405]
0.155
[0.314]
0.422
[0.508]
0.758*
[0.450]
0.026
[0.016]
0.001
[0.016]
0.457
[0.454]
0.052
[0.389]
0.336
[0.511]
0.568
[0.497]
 0.383
[0.749]
11.017**
[4.767]
8.606***
[2.788]
118 158
Appendix Table 2
Balancing test on covariates between key and ordinary farmers (Kernel Matching). Balancing test on covariates between intermediary and ordinary farmers (Kernel Matching).
2009 2010 2011 2012
Treated Control t-test Treated Control t-test Treated Control t-test Treated Control t-test
=1 if female headed household 0.08 0.14 0.46 0.08 0.14 0.40 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.19
Number of adult household members 3.17 3.17 0.00 3.17 3.15 0.02 3.18 3.01 0.27 2.67 2.83 0.27
Number of adult members squared 12.17 12.81 0.13 12.17 12.50 0.07 12.46 10.79 0.36 8.44 9.42 0.26
Age of household head 48.33 47.74 0.14 48.33 47.76 0.14 49.36 47.50 0.43 47.11 48.83 0.33
Age of household head squared /1000 2.43 2.38 0.12 2.43 2.38 0.12 2.53 2.35 0.4 2.33 2.49 0.30
Average years of schooling of adult household members 7.02 6.98 0.08 7.02 7.03 0.02 6.78 7.06 0.51 6.69 6.91 0.32
Years of education squared /1000 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.6 0.05 0.05 0.37
Size of sample plot (ha) 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.17
Size of owned plots in upland area (ha) 0.03 0.04 0.32 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.01 0.02 0.21
Size of owned plots in lowland area except sample plot (ha) 0.24 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.53
Value of household asset (million Tsh) 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.34 0.51 0.53 0.16 0.49 0.46 0.19
=1 if he/she is a member of the same church/mosque as key or
intermediate farmers
1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
=1 if he/she has a relative among key or intermediate farmers 0.67 0.72 0.26 0.67 0.72 0.28 0.64 0.76 0.62 0.78 0.69 0.40
=1 if he/she is a relative of key or intermediate farmers 0.83 0.79 0.26 0.83 0.81 0.16 0.82 0.88 0.39 0.78 0.81 0.17
Number of relatives in the village 12.50 11.90 0.12 12.50 11.48 0.19 11.82 12.22 0.06 14.44 12.03 0.34
Irrigation block B 0.42 0.42 0.04 0.42 0.42 0.01 0.36 0.42 0.27 0.33 0.42 0.37
Irrigation block C 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.18 0.48 0.33 0.24 0.43
Irrigation block D 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 0.00 – 0.00 0.00 –
Pseudo R-squared 0.035 0.027 0.163 0.082
Sample Size 116 118 101 97
Off support 2 1 1 2
=1 if female headed household 0.32 0.27 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.00
Number of adult household members 3.00 2.90 0.24 3.00 2.90 0.24 3.21 2.83 0.73 3.31 2.76 1.07
Number of adult members squared 10.79 9.97 0.25 10.79 9.96 0.25 12.36 9.58 0.68 13.15 8.56 1.16
Age of household head 49.90 49.03 0.22 49.90 49.02 0.23 50.79 48.95 0.39 48.85 50.22 0.29
Age of household head squared/1000 2.63 2.54 0.23 2.63 2.53 0.24 2.72 2.54 0.38 2.51 2.65 0.30
Average years of schooling of adult household members 6.62 6.47 0.29 6.62 6.49 0.25 6.47 6.45 0.03 6.47 6.42 0.08
Years of education squared/1000 0.05 0.04 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
Size of sample plot (ha) 0.40 0.40 0.16 0.40 0.41 0.03 0.42 0.42 0.00 0.40 0.43 0.36
Size of owned plots in upland area (ha) 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.88 0.06 0.10 0.42
Size of owned plots in lowland area except sample plot (ha) 0.32 0.32 0.05 0.32 0.31 0.07 0.24 0.34 0.58 0.24 0.32 0.49
Value of household asset (million Tsh) 0.52 0.46 0.29 0.52 0.47 0.28 0.52 0.51 0.05 0.56 0.48 0.35
=1 if he/she is a member of the same church/mosque as key or
intermediate farmers
0.89 0.86 0.35 0.89 0.86 0.34 0.93 0.85 0.67 0.92 0.80 0.86
=1 if he/she has a relative among key or intermediate farmers 0.63 0.57 0.40 0.63 0.57 0.38 0.64 0.63 0.08 0.54 0.60 0.32
=1 if he/she is a relative of key or intermediate farmers 0.89 0.86 0.36 0.89 0.86 0.34 0.86 0.83 0.18 0.85 0.85 0.03
Number of relatives in the village 9.21 9.32 0.04 9.21 9.24 0.01 7.21 10.13 0.89 8.62 9.35 0.20
Irrigation block B 0.58 0.64 0.38 0.58 0.64 0.35 0.57 0.58 0.05 0.62 0.61 0.01
Irrigation block C 0.21 0.13 0.64 0.21 0.13 0.66 0.29 0.16 0.76 0.23 0.14 0.56
Irrigation block D 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.60 0.00 0.03 0.61
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.018 0.103 0.139
Sample Size 156 158 132 131
Off support 4 4 3 4
T-statistics are shown in the t-test columns.
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